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The survey of selected important enactments of the Twenty-Seventh
Legislature of the State of Washington, first installment of which
appeared in the April issue of the REVww, is continued and concluded
in this issue.
In addition to the assistance earlier mentioned, Professor M.IcAllister
and Professor Harsch wish to acknowledge the aid of Mr. Arthur T.
Bateman and Mr. Franklin K. Fogg, members of the student editorial
board of the REVIEW, in the preparation of material appearing in this
issue.
AGRICULTURE
Apiculture. In Chapter 130 the legislature has sought to protect
domestic beekeepers against the introduction of bee diseases from out
of state. This is done by prohibiting the shipment into the state of any
bees other than in combless packages, and all packages must carry a
certificate issued by an inspector of the state of origin of the shipment
showing freedom from contagious bee diseases. In addition bees may
not be brought in in hives nor may used bee supplies or other used
apiary equipment be brought in at all.1 These requirements are a good
deal stricter than those contained in existing laws. 2 Practically every
state engages in bee" inspection and certification of freedom from dis-
ease so that recognition of out of state inspection should not create
difficulties.
Section 5 of Chapter 130 authorizes the Director of Agriculture to
permit the introduction of bees in hives or on combs from beekeepers
who have been located not more than ten miles from the state border
for a period of not less than one year. This will permit local beekeepers
to continue the practice of pasturing their bees across the state line and
the one year requirement will, of course, prevent out of state beekeepers
from establishing colonies within the ten mile limit for short periods
and then demanding entry.
Economic Poisons. The term "economic poisons" has been coined in
Chapter 230 to describe what most people will continue to call insecti-
cides and fungicides. Perhaps the new term was introducedk because
' These provisions are closely related to the prevention of the spread of bee
diseases. In a letter to the Review dated April 9, 1941, Mr. Walter J. Robinson,
Director of the Department of Agriculture, points out that in the case of combless
packages certification of freedom from disease can be made with a reasonable degree
of certainty but that this guarantee cannot be extended to used hives and equip-
ment.
2 L. '33, ch. 59, § 10; REM. Rrv. STAT. (Supp.) §§ 3170-1-12.
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Chapter 230 takes in some new territory. It covers rodents and preda-
tory animals. That means rat poison though we learn from the defini-
tions that rabbits and hares are also rodents.
8 The definition of a
"weed" is pretty neat, too. A "weed," we learn, is "any plant which
grows where not wanted."4 It's just like the pig in the parlor.
At any rate, now that we know what "economic poisons" are,-Chap-
ter 230 repeals earlier laws as to insecticides and fungicides5 and con-
tains a new statement as to what shall constitute adulteration and mis-
branding.8 In addition it requires every manufacturer, .importer or
dealer to register his poison and get a license from the Department of
Agriculture before he may sell it. The annual fee is $10.00 for one
variety and $5.00 for each additional variety. It is at this registration
and licensing point that the statutory controls are most effective. Licens-
ing and registration go together and, of course, it is unlawful to sell any
unlicensed and unregistered poisons. 'In broad terms are given the
powers of the Director to refuse or cancel registration.' In addition
rules and regulations may be promulgated by the majority vote of a
board consisting of the Director, the State Chemist and three specified
professors of the State College of Wa~hington 8 and one who "repeatedly
violates" any of them may be refused a license or have it canceled.9
The Director of Agriculture is also given broad powers to seize and
quarantine economic poison 10 and presumably this may be done in a
summary manner.
Horticultural Pests. Chapter 20 recites that its purpose is to provide
machinery for the abatement of "infested horticultural property . . .
with the least possible delay."" Yet earlier statutes -that provided an
even more summary method are left on the books.' 2 Thus, under Chap-
ter 20 a horticultural inspector who finds any infested premises must
make a report to the inspector-at-large who in turn appoints a grower
who might be affected by the infestation and who resides within three
miles of the infested premises together with himself or someone from
his department. These two appoint a third person who must be a
grower who might be affected by the infestation and these three make
S§ 1(d). '§1(c).5 REM. REv. STAT. §§ 2844-2846. 6 §§ 3, 4.
§ 14. The Director may, after hearing, cancel the registration of, or refuse to
register, any economic poison:
(a) Which is of little or no value for the purpose for which it is intended, or
which is detrimental to vegetation, except weeds, to domestic animals, or to the
public health and safety when properly used, and may require such practical dem-
onstration as may be necessary to determine said facts.
I (b) Concerning which false or misleading statements are made or implied by
the registrant or his agent, either verbally or in writing or in the form of adver-
tising literature.
8§ 8. 9§ 14.
o§ 16. 1§ 1.
12 REM. REV. STAT., §§ 2847-2852.
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up what is called an inspection board.1 The board must make an in-
spection of the premises and submit a written report of its findings as
to infestation.14 Since only a majority must sign the report 15 it is plain
enough that the course of events may be determined at this stage by
two interested parties, that is, two affected growers. If the report finds
infestation it must be submitted by the inspector-at-large to the prose-
cuting attorney and he is required to institute proceedings in the su-
perior court praying that the court direct "the immediate destruction
of such plants, products or property upon said premises."16 In the court
proceeding the report of the inspection board is to be "accepted as prima
Jacie evidence and if there is no showing that said inspection board
acted in a capricious, arbitrary, unfair manner" then the court shall
order the infested property to be destroyed at the cost of the de-
fendant."
Under earlier statutes infested property might be condemned on the
say so of the horticultural inspector and resort was had to judicial
proceedings only if the property owner did not comply with the in-
spector's order.'8 In those proceedings proof had to be made as in any
other case and Chapter 20, in so far as it gives weight to the report of
the inspection board, is doubtless designed to expedite proceedings in
court. A curious feature of Chapter 20 is that it seems to look only
to a destruction of infested property, 9 yet the horticultural pests that
are defined in an earlier statute (and this definition is adopted by ref-
erence in Chapter 20) are classified in terms of the methods to be
employed for their control and eradication. As to most of them only
spraying with insecticides may be required while destruction of in-
fected plants may be required only for bacterial diseases.2 0 This poses
what may turn out to be a troublesome question of statutory construc-
tion. Is the power to order destruction under Chapter 20 applicable to
all pests named in the earlier statute even though, as to most of them,
only spraying could have been theretofore required or is it applicable
only to those pests named in the earlier statute as being subject to the
requirement of destruction? The answer to this question will have a
bearing on the answer to another equally troublesome one and that is
the extent to which Chapter 20 supersedes the more summary powers
granted under earlier statutes. Nothing is expressly repealed by Chap-
ter 20, a few sections of earlier statutes are expressly adopted and a
13§ 5. 14 § 6.
1"§ 7. 16§ 8.
,1 § 10.
REM. REv STAT., §§ 2848-2849-1-4.
,o§ 10 which deals with the powers of the superior court talks only of the
power of the court to order the inspector-at-large "to forthwith destroy" the
property.
2 REM. REV. STAT, § 2843.
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few expressly amended but for the rest there is ample room for argu-
ment about inconsistency and the like.
The constitutional validity of many drastic powers conferred under
earlier statutes dealing with the same and related matters has been
sustained by the Supreme Court of this state.2 1 It seems plain enough.
that no serious federal question could be raised. 22 The inspection board
made up of two interested private parties and an agent of the state has
no power to do anything by 'itself but its report, as we have seen, is
given weight in court under Chapter 20. It may be argued that this
is a form, even though a very mild one, of delegation of governmental
powers to private persons. In some instances this has spelled invalid-
ity 3 but the Supreme Court of Washington has never given much
weight to this objection.24
Sale of Cantaloupes and Potatoes. Chapter 189 requires that all
potatoes and cantaloupes shall be inspected before shipment. The lan-
guage of this chapter follows closely one section of the more elaborate
provisions relating to apples and pears.
2 5
Seed Regulation. Chapter 56 is the New Washington State Seed
Law. It repeals the earlier ones and though it marks no striking de-
partures from them it comes so soon after the passage of the new Fed-
eral Seed Act of 193926 that it is worthy of more extended comment
than it would otherwise deserve.
The coverage of both acts is much the same. Both relate, to agri-
cultural and vegetable seeds. The definition of vegetable seeds is sub-
stantially the same27 though in the case of agricultural seeds the federal
act spells out a detailed list 28 while the state nieasure relies on a gen-
eral definition. 29 Both represent an effort, among other things, to con-
21 Carstens v. DeSellem, 82 Wash. 643, 144 Pac. 934 (1914); Shafford v. Brown,
49 Wash. 307, 95 Pac. 270 (1908)-horticultural pests; State ex rel. Ryan v. Coyne,
122 Wash. 462, 210 Pac. 799 (1922) ; State ex rel. Brown v. Barnes, 155 Wash. 1,
283 Pac. 191 (1929)-inspecting and disinfecting orchards; Wedemeyer v. Crouch,
68 Wash. 14, 122 Pac. 366 (1912); Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Adams County,
78 Wash. 53, 138 Pac. 307 (1914)-noxious weeds; State ex rel. Stanger v. Bartlett,
112 Wash. 299, 192 Pac. 945 (1920)--extermination of rodents. For cases from
other states see 43 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1080, 1090; 12 A. L. R. 1136; 61 A. L. R. 1145.
22 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928)-sustaining the drastic Cedar Rust
Act of Virginia against attack under the federal due process clause.
2 The cases are collected and discussed in Jaffee, Law Making by Private
Groups, (1937) 51 HARv. L. REV. 201; De'egation of Power to Private Parties,
(1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 447; Delegation of Governmental Powers to Private Groups
(1932), 32 COL. L. REv. 80.I "See Spokane v. Camp, 50 Wash. 554, 97 Pac. 770 (1908); Storey v. Seattle,
124 Wash. 598, 215 Pac. 514 (1923) ; State ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
144 Wash. 74, 256 Pac. 781 (1927), reversed 278 U. S. 116.
25 REm. REv. STAT. § 2867.
20- 7 U. S. C. A. § 1551.
27 Federal Seed Act, 7 U. S. C. A. § 1561(7) (B).
28 7 U.S. C. A. § 1561(7) (A). This list is subject to a power in the Secretary
of Agriculture to add to or subtract from it.
2 Ch. 56, § 5.
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trol the spread of noxious weed seeds and it is on this point that the
two measures dovetail for the federal act recognizes as weed seeds those,
among others, that are recognized as such by the state into which the
seed is to be transported. 80 The state measure, very properly, spells
out a list and definition of noxious-weed seeds and empowers the Di-
rector of Agriculture to add to or subtract from this list."' When it comes
to the provisions as to labeling, however, there is no comparable dove-
tailing. The Federal Seed Act and The Washington State Seed Law
each goes its own way. It is quite true that the provisions of the state
law seem to have been patterned after those of the new federal act but
still there are differences and even though they may appear to be differ-
ences in detail the result none the less is that two requirements will
have to be met and two offenses created in many instances. There is
no great novelty in this sort of thing under our federal system but lack
of novelty furnishes no basis for pointing to it as a desirable way of
doing this governmental job. Both laws urge the officials charged with
administratior to cooperate with each other but cooperation will not
always make one requirement grow where two grew before. This is
necessarily so where, as here, many requirements are spelled out in the
statutes themselves. Unless the interstate seller of seed is willing to
put both a federal and a state label on his containers there will surely
arise questions as to whether the Federal Seed Act has occupied the
field to the exclusion of state action or whether both may occupy the
same field. The Supreme Court has been none too eager to find con-
flict between state and federal laws or that Congress has "occupied the
field."32 Perhaps this feature of the new seed law should not be tagged
as a trade barrier law and condemned as such but at least it should be
pointed out that more explicit attention to the dovetailing of state and
federal requirements would have obviated much of the friction that
may easily arise as the statutes stand now. It should be noted, too,
that under Section 37 seed imported from another state that has been
inspected and certified under a seed law of that state may be sold if
and only if "such seed complies with the rules and regulations adopted
and promulgated by the Director of Agriculture of this state." Here,
too, may be a source of friction. Commerce clause objections are not
likely to prevail in court against any of the requirements the state
3 0 7 U. S. C. A. § 1561(8) (A).31 Ch. 56, §§ 8-12.
2 It was not found in Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912), or in Weigle v.
Curtice Bros., 248 U. S. 285 (1919), or in two more recent cases, Kelly v. State of
Washington 302 U. S. 1 (1937), and H. P. Welch Co. v. State of New Hampshire,
306 U. S. 79 (1939). Its discovery in McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913),
sets this case apart and the court is not likely to repeat the mistake it made in
discovering it in Oregon-Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87
(1926). Congress nullified this last decision six weeks after it was handed down,
see 7 U. S. C., § 161.
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may impose. "" The responsibility for the avoidance of trade barriers
in this field rests with both the legislature and the administrators.
There are two features of the statute that raise commerce clause
questions. The first is raised by Section 21 of Chapter 56. Under this
section a seller may avoid the penalties of the act if he sells seed as
to which he can produce a declaration from his supplier showing the
kind of seed sold. The supplier must, however, be one who is "within
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.8 4 This section is obviously
designed to shift liability to the supplier of seed that is later sold by
others. It will be easy enough for the local dealer buying from a local
supplier to protect himself but if he buys from an out of state supplier
he is not protected unless the out of state supplier has taken steps to
subject himself to the jurisdiction of the local courts. Obviously the
out of state supplier is not barred entirely and obviously, too, the
requirement when met simply puts him on the same basis as the local
supplier. He, like the local supplier, is then subject to the penalties
of the act. He may do his interstate business, if such it be, without
meeting the requirement but the compulsions of business may be quite
as strong as the compulsions of a statute which imposed the require-
ment as a condition to the doing of any business. A statutory condition
of that kind, as applied to interstate sales, might well point to invalid-
ity under the commerce clause.85
The other point involves Sections 34 and 35 of Chapter 56. Under
Section 34 it is unlawful to sell, deal in or import into the state any
agricultural or vegetable seeds without a license from the Director of
Agriculture. The license costs $10.00 a year and there must be a sepa-
rate license for each regular place of business. If this means that one
who has no regular place of business within the state may not get a
license at all and as a consequence may not sell seed from out of state
then a commerce clause question is surely raised. If this means that
the interstate seller even though he has no place of business must still
" See, for examples, Weigle v. Curtice Bros., 248 U.S. 285 (1919), McDermott
v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913), and Bourjois v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937).
For other cases see 57 A. L. R. 686 and Ann. Cas. 1917E 158.
" § 21 reads as follows: "No person shall he subject to the penalties of this act,
for having sold, offered or exposed for sale in this state any agricultural or vegetable
seeds, which were incorrectly labeled or misrepresented as to kind, variety, type or
origin of seeds which cannot be identified by exafiaination thereof, if he has obtained
and does produce for inspection an invoice or a declaration from a seller or grower
within the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, giving kind, or kind and variety,
or kind and type., and origin, if required, and if he has taken such other precautions
as may be necessary to insure the identity to be that stated."
" See, for example, cases like International Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S.
91 (1910)-invalidating a statute barring undomesticated foreign corporations from
the local courts and to the same effect, Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197
(1914). See Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate
Commerce, (1933) 17 Mum. L. Rav. 381. On the other hand, equality is the theme
of this provision and nowadays this may be more important than it used to be,
see Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
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get a license before he may sell seed here then, too, the same question
is raised.86 No discrimination against the interstate seller is apparent
but he must pay the fee as a condition to doing business. It might be
argued that this is an inspection fee and valid as such against commerce
clause objections. In support of this it will be said that under Section
38 all moneys collected are to be expended only for necessary expenses
under the act but when the claim of inspection fee is advanced the
Supreme Court has often looked to see whether the amount of the fee
bore some proper relation to the cost of inspection.37 Under this act the
Director of Agriculture has many duties other than inspection.
BRECK P. McALLISTER.
BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Double Liability. In November, 1940, the people approved an
amendment' to Section 11, Article XII, of the Constitution, by which
the Legislature was empowered to relieve stockholders in federally
insured2 state banks from liability "to the same extent that stock-
holders of national banking associations are relieved * * *." Chapter
16 of the Laws of 1941, representing an amendment to Sections 3242
and 3824, REM. REV. STAT., was enacted in pursuance of this con-
stitutional amendment.
By subdivision (b) of the act it is provided that the double liability
shall not attach to shares in federally insured state banks issued after
the effective date of the act, June 12, 1941. This subdivision, of course,
does not touch the double liability in respect to shares now issued or
to be issued prior to June 12, 1941.1
" Beginning with Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489(1887) the Supreme Court in a long line of cases has invalidated fixed sum license
taxes as applied to drummers and others soliciting orders for out of state suppliers
who filled them by interstate transportation. The cases are collected and discussed
in Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, (1939) 52 HARv. L. REV. 617.
Necessarily the facts as to the course of business are all important.
"' Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389 (1919); Phipps v. Cleveland Re-
fining Co., 261 U. S. 449 (1923); D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494
(1914).
1. '39, p. 1024 (Senate Joint Resolution No. 8).
2 The Supervisor of Banking advLes that on March 26, 1941, there were
91 commercial state banks doing business in the state and that all but
four of these are insured.
'The expression in this subdivision, "shares * which are issued
after this act takes effect", plainly has reference only to the stock of
banks subsequently organized or to the new or increased stock of existing
banks. It does not embrace existing stock, though evidenced by certifi-
cates issued after the effective date of the act. In other words. "there
is a distinction between the certificate issued to a shareholder and the
'share' issued to him. * * * a share of stock is the actual property of the
shareholder, while the stock certificate is merely the authentic evidence
of the stockholder's ownership of shares." Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation v. Gunderson, 106 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (construing
the federal act of 1933 lifting the additional liability in respect to national
bank shares "issued after June 16, 1933"). See also: Commissioner v.
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As to stock already issued, subdivision (c) provides that the double
liability in respect to existing shares in federally insured state banks
shall cease on December 13, 1941 (approximately six months after
the effective date of the act), if not less than -five months prior to
that date, the bank shall have published a notice of the prospective
termination in a newspaper in the city, town or county in which the
bank is located. It is additionally provided that if the bank fails t6
give the notice within the time provided, termination of the double
liability "may thereafter be accomplished as of the date five months
subsequent to publication."
The Washington act follows very closely the federal act of 1935,1
providing for the termination of additional liability in respect to exist-
ing shares in national banking associations, although the termination
date in the federal act was set almost two years after the 'effective
date of the act. The shorter period of the Washington act has, how-
ever, substantial precedent in similar recent legislation in other states.5
The deferment of the termination of the double liability for a, rea-
sonable period beyond the effective date of the act appears to be
necessary because of the prevailing view that the liability, being con-
tractual in nature, cannot constitutionally be taken away or impaired
as against existing creditors.' As far as demand depositors are con-
cerned, this constitutional objection is overcome by the grant of a
reasonable period for the termination of the debtor-creditor relation-
ship. Consequently, "ordinary depositors * * *, even. if not fully
protected by the substituted insurance, would seem unqualified to
Scatena, 85 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); Wood v. Commissioner, 75
F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. Ist, 1935); Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28
S. Ct. 512 (1907); Farrington v. State of Tennessee, 95 U.,S. 679 (1878);
Holland v. Duluth Iron Min. & Development Co., 65 Minn. 324, 68 N. W.
50, 60 Am. St. Rep. 480 (1896).
'49, STAT. 708 (1935), now included as the last two sentences of 12
U S. C. § 64a (1936).
For example: California (DEERING, GENERAL LAWS 1937, Act 652a § 1.1)
liability terminated six months after published notice and notice to
superintendent of banks; Colorado (Laws 1937, c. 103)-liability terminated
immediately, with requirement for publication of notice once a week
for three successive weeks; Kansas (Laws 1937, c. 75)-liability terminated
six months after published notice; Kentucky (Laws 1936, c. 12)-act ap-
proved February 21, 1936, liability to terminate July 1, 1937, conditioned
on published notice six months prior to termination; Nebraska (Laws
1939, c. 2)-act approved March 17, 1939, liability terminated September
1, 1940; N. Y. BANKING LAW § 113b (1939)-liability terminated approx-
imately 13 months after effective date of act, conditioned upon published
notice six months prior to termination; North Carolina (Laws 1935, c. 99)-
act effective March 18, 1935, liability terminated July 1, 1935; individual
notice of termination required to be sent to each depositor on or before
May 1, and four weeks publication of notice required before May 1,
Wyoming (Laws 1937, c. 42)-act effective February 16, 1937, liability
terminated July 1, 1937, conditioned on publication of notice once a week
for four successive weeks, to commence 60 days prior to termination.
4 Hathorn v. Calef, 69 U. S. 10 (1865); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434




attack the provision."' A more serious question arises in respect to
creditors whose obligations do not mature prior to December 13, 1941
(i.e., which are due at a fixed time after that date), and depositors
who are minors or incompetents without proper guardians to receive
notice of termination. As to these, it has been suggested that legisla-
tion such as this would likely not operate to discharge the double
liability." It has also been suggested that the double liability may
survive a statute such as this in respect to deposits which have become
"derelict" under the eccheat law." Also, it seems clear that claims
based on the double liability which may accrue prior to December 13,
1941, will not be affected (though remaining subject, of course, to
existing, applicable statutes of limitation). Whether, insofar as ter-
mination of liability under this act is concerned, such a claim accrues
upon the insolvency of the bank or at the time of the assessment or at
some intervening time is a question which is perhaps not entirely free
from difficulty. The Washington court has heretofore held that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the making of the
assessment.10  J. F. F.
Collateral Security-Public and Trust Funds. Senate Bill No. 135
no doubt was designed to provide a blanket authorization for the
investment of public and trust funds in three types of obligation: (a)
obligations issued pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act;" (b) obligations issued pursuant to Title IV of the
National Housing Act;'12 and (c) the shares, deposits or accounts of
institutions insured under Title IV of the National Housing Act.'"
(Section 1.)
The bill also authorized (Section 2) use of the above described
obligations, shares, deposits or accounts, "at face value or withdrawal
value", as collateral security for the deposit of public or other funds,
Legislation Note, Federal Insurance of Deposits (1936) 36 COL. L. REv.
809, 829.
'Comment, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1935
(1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 355, 357. It should be noted, however, that the
North Carolina statute (N. C. Laws 1935, c. 99) which was the subject
of this comment required, in addition to publication, that the notice be
sent "by mail or otherwise" to each creditor at his last known address.
See also: Legislation Note, note 7 supra.
'Comment, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1935
(1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 355, 357.
1o Guaranty Trust Co. v. Scoon, 144 Wash 33, 256 Pac. 74 (1927); Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. Satterwhite, 2 Wn. (2d) 252, 97 P. (2d) 1055 (1940). See
Robinson v. Hospelhorn, 169 Md. 177, 179 Atl. 515 (1935).
11Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 47 STAT. 725 (1932), 12 U. S. C. 1421
et seq. (1936) Cf. 47 STAT. 736 (1932), 12 U. S. C. § 1435 (1936).
12 National Housing Act, 48 STAT. 1246 (1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq.
(1936); Title IV, Insurance of Savings and Loan Accounts, 48 STAT 1255
(1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1724 et seq. (1936); 48 STAT. 1256 (1934), 49 STAT. 298
(1935), 12 U. S. C. § 1725 (1936) (Obligations of Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation authorized).
3 48STAT. 1257 (1934), 49 STAT. 298 (1935), 12 U. S. C. § 1726 (1936).
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wherever required by statute of the state or otherwise; as deposits to
be made with any public official or department, wherever required by
statute of the state or otherwise; as investments of capital or surplus,
or as reserve or other fund, wherever, by statute of the-state or other-
wise, the same are.required to be maintained consisting of designated
security; or, in lieu of "any surety, whether personal, corporate or
otherwise, or any collateral or security" wherever, by statute of the
state or otherwise, the same is required or permitted for any purpose.'t
The Governor vetoed Section 1 and thus eliminated the investment
authorization feature of the bill.15 Section 2 remains, and the bill
thus became a law as Chapter 249, in effect authorizing the use of
certain described obligations as collateral security, or in lieu of de-
posits or sureties, or as permissible investment for capital, surplus,
reserves, or other funds required to be invested in designated secur.
ities.16
As enacted, the bill covered two subjects; both subjects were ade-
quately described in the title, yet both are obvious subjects 'of in-
dependent legislation. Because of the title it cannot be said that the
bill as passed violated the constitutional prohibition against including
in a single bill subject matter not described by the title.' 7 Viewing
each section of the bill as relating to the same three types of obliga-
tions, neither section involves more than one legislative subject, as
all three types of obligation mentioned are germane to the subject
of authorized investments (Section 1), and to the subject of permis-
sible collateral security (Section 2). Similar relationship between the
regulation of permissible investment and the authorization of substi-
tute security, etc., is not so clear.' s If the bill be objectionable on
this ground, reference to both subjects in the title does not avoid
the objection, but can the veto of Section 1 have that effect?' 9
E. C. L.
1 This is an attempt by paraphrase to clarify the rather involved word-
ing of § 2.
"
5 Cf. Rxmv. Rzv* STAT. §§ 5545-1, 5545-2 (Supp. 1939) covering somewhat
similar authorization respecting notes or bonds of the Federal Housing
Administration, bonds of the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and "bonds
of any other corporation which is or hereafter may be created by the
United States, as a government agency or instrumentality."
16 Cf. REm. REv. STAT. § 5545-3 (Supp. 1939), making somewhat similar
provision respecting the obligations described in note 15 supra.
27 WASH. CoNsT., AxT. II, § 19: "No bill shall embrace more than one
subject and that shall be expressed in the title."
18 See Weed v. Goodwin, 36 Wash. 31, 78 Pac. 36 (1904); State ex Tel.
Reitmeier v. Oakley, 129 Wash. 553, 225 Pac. 425 (1924).
10 Cf. Reilly v. Knapp, 105 Kan. 565, 185 Pac. 47 (1919); State ex tel.
Miller v. Caldwell, 17 Neb. 85, 22 N. W. 228 (1885). In these cases it was
recognized that the ordinary effect of including two distinct subjects in an
act is to render the whole act void; yet in each case it was held that an
"unrelated" section, only, need be invalidated, if it clearly appeared that
it was not the inducement for passage of the act.
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Collateral Security-Bankruptcy Funds. By the Chandler Act, 0
Section 61" of the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, was amended to
permit judges of the several courts of bankruptcy to accept from des-
ignated depositories of bankruptcy funds, in lieu of surety bonds, the
deposit2 2 of securities2" to secure the repayment of the deposited
funds." The Chandler Act also specifically authorized national banking
associations to give such security.
Chapter 38 of the Laws of 1941 authorizes a state bank or trust
company, in order to qualify as a depository for bankruptcy funds, to
pledge its assets in such amount and in such manner "as may be from
tinme to time required by statutes of the United States or rules made
in pursuance thereof"."5  J. F. F.
Collateral Security-City and County Funds. By Chapter 186 of
the Laws of 1929, a depositary of city, town or county funds was per-
mitted, in lieu of the deposit of pledged securities with the city
comptroller or treasurer or county treasurer (see REI. REv. STAT.
Sections 5563, 5569, 5572), to "require the treasurer of such city,
town or county to designate a trust company or bank exercising trust
powers and located within the State of Washington as a trustee for
the safekeeping of such bonds and securities."2" That act further
provided for the issuance by the trustee of duplicate receipts, one of
the duplicates to be delivered to the city or county treasurer, and
the other to the depositary,27 and that in the event of the insolvency
of the depositary, the trustee shall, upon demand, deliver the pledged
securities to the city or county treasurer. 28
By Chapter 18 of the Laws of 1941, Section 1 of the 1929 act is
amended to permit a county depositary to deposit pledged securities
with an out-of-state corporate trustee, as well as one located within
2152 STAT. 872 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 101 (1940).
"1 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 49 STAT. 721 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 101 (1937).
22 The Chandler Act provides that the securities shall be placed "in
the custody of Federal Reserve Banks or branches thereof designated by
the judges of the several Courts of Bankruptcy, subject to the orders
of such judges."
2' As to the character of acceptable securities, the Chandler Act makes
reference to the Revenue Act of 1926 § 1126, 6 U. S. C. 15 (1927), aF
amended by 49 STAT. 22 (1935), 6 U. S. C. § 15 (Supp. 1940). By the
terms of the latter act, acceptable securities are limited to "United States
Liberty Bonds or other bonds or notes of the United States", "bonds
or notes of the United States" meaning "any public-debt obligations of
the United States and any bonds, notes or other obligations which are
unconditionally guaranteed as to both interest and principal by the
United States."
21 Security is not required in respect to such part of the deposits as
are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
2 ,The existing statutory provisions applicable to pledges by state
banks to secure deposits are contained in REM. REV. STAT. § 3261.
26 L. '29, c. 186, § 1; REM. REV. STAT. § 5574-1.
2 Id. § 2; REM. REV. STAT. § 5574-2.
21 Id. § 3; REM. REV. STAT. § 5574-3.
[VOL.16
the state,29 "Provided, Such trust company or bank so designated and
located without the state shall have a combined actual paid-up capital
and surplus of not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000); And
provided further, That the identity of such trustee, the terms of the
agreement between such trustee and the depository, and the character
of the bonds or securities pledged, shall all be subject to the approval
of the county treasurer."
The purpose and precise effect of that part of the second proviso
to the effect that the "character of the bonds or securities pledged"
shall be subject to the approval of the county treasurer, are not entirely
dear. In this connection it should be noted that the existing statutes
applicable to pledges to secure city and town deposits, though enumer-
ating in detail the character of acceptable securities, provide that (in
the case of deposits of cities of over 75,000 inhabitants) the secur-
ities "shall be in such form as shall be approved by the corporation
counsel * * * and the sufficiency * * * of such securities shall be
approved by the mayor and comptroller",30 and (in the case of de-
posits of cities of less than 75,000 inhabitants) the "securities * * *
shall not be considered sufficient unless and until * * * approved by
the mayor and comptroller or town clerk." 31 The existing statute
(REM. REv. STAT. § 5563) applicable to pledges securing county
deposits contains no such approval provision, and it seems likely that
one of the purposes of the second proviso of the 1941 act was to bring
the county provisions in line with those applicable to cities and towns,
although here again it should be noted that the county statute, like
the city and town statutes, prescribes in detail the character of ac-
ceptable securities.
It is possible that the second proviso of the 1941 act was intended
to be applicable only to the deposit of pledged securities by a county
depositary with an out-of-state trustee. Taking into account the
legislative history of the amended section, it seems possible that it
would be so held. On the other hand, reading the amended statute
as a whole, and literally, the second proviso of the 1941 act seems as
applicable to the deposit of securities by a county depositary with a
domestic trustee as with one located without the state. J. F. F.
Mutual Savings Banks. Chapter 15 enacts some substantial revisions
." It is difficult to identify a rational basis for making this distinction
between county and city depositaries. As to the reason for the amend-
ment, counsel for the Washington State Bankers Association advises that
"several of the larger banks keep most of their securities on deposit in
the East to facilitate the exchange and sale thereof", and that the re-
quirement of the 1929 act that the securities be deposited ,with a local
trustee has involved "in some cases a rather heavy outlay of funds for
postage and insurance running up to several thousand dollars a year for
some of the larger banks." These considerations would appear to be as
applicable to city as to county depositaries.
30 REmi. REv. STAT. § 5569. 1 " REm. REV. STAT. § 5572.
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of the statutes governing mutual savings banks,32 the revisions being
calculated, mainly, to clarify the admissible administrative activities of
these institutions. However, in three particulars the scope of their
banking functions has been enlarged:
(1) The deposit limit has been increased so as to permit consolida-
tion of mutual savings banks having common depositors who have
reached the limit of $7,500 in each bank. The purpose apparently is
to authorize the consolidated bank to continue to carry the combined
deposit of $15,000.11
(2) The catalogue of permissible investments is enlarged to include
loans secured by contracts of the United States or any agency or
department thereof assigned under the "Assignment of Claims Act
of 1940."' 3
(3) The list of permissible investments is also clarified as to the
inclusion of "Water District" warrants or bonds, and to include the
revenue bonds of any city or public utility district water, sewer or
electric system (in this state);"5 and also electric revenue bonds of
any incorporated city in the United States having a population of at
least 45,000.36 E. C. L.
Savings and Loan Associations. The major portion of House Bill
No. 330, a part of which became law as Chapter 222, was vetoed.
An examination of the vetoed sections discloses that, despite their
voluminous proportions, the proposed changes in the existing law were
slight. Substantially, the proposals vetoed were: Inclusion of bor-
rowers in the definition of members with right to vote; 31 permission
for investment of public and trust funds (not association funds) in
shares insured by any state corporation or agency as well as in shares
insured by federal corporation or agency;38 and liberalizing the re-
strictions on investments of association funds in light, water and sewer
revenue bonds,39 and in the purchase of real estate contracts. 40
32REM. REV. STAT. §§ 3313 et seq.
" L. '41, c. 15, § 2, amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3346.
34 L. '41, c. 15, § 6, amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3381-3a (Supp. 1939).
The "Assignment of Claims Act of 1940" is 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), amending
REV. STAT. § 3477 (1875), 35 STAT. 411 (1908), 31 U. S. C. § 203 (1927); REV.
STAT. § 3737 (1862), 41 U. S. C. § 15 (1928).
"L. '41, c. 15, § 7; amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3381-6 (Supp. 1939).
36 L. '41, c. 15, § 8; amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3381-8a (Supp. 1939).
1.7 H. B. 330, Sec. 1; amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3717-2 (Supp. 1939).
"1 H. B. 330, Sec. 2, amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3717-23 (Supp. 1939). Cf.
REM. REV. STAT. § 3717-56 (15), authorizing investment of association funds
in share insured by either federal or state agency.
" H. B. 330, Sec. 4, amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3717-56 (6) (Supp. 1939)
so as to eliminate the restriction on investments of this type in bonds of
cities in this state.
46 H. B. 330, Sec. 4, amending REM. REV. STAT. § 3717-56 (lC) (Supp.
1939), so as to make the "higher" rather than the "lower" of 80 per cent
of the sale price or 75 per cent of the appraisal value determine per-
missible investments in real estate contracts.
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The unvetoed sections clarify the reserve requirements, 41 and modify
in some particulars the two and two and one-half per cent maximum
limitations upon permissible operating expenses.4 2  E. C. L.
JUDSON F. FALK.NOR AND EUGE E C. LuccocK.
INSURANCE
The following changes in the Insurance Code relate to matters which
are of interest chiefly to the companies and their agents:
Chapter 40: Section 1 of this act amends chapter 49 of the Laws
of 19111 by adding a new section designated as Section 83-A, which
pemits motor vehicle insurance carriers to write, in connection with
their motor vehicle policies, coverage for injuries or death to persons
while operating, driving, riding in, alighting from, adjusting, repairing
or being, struck or run down by a motor vehicle, such coverage being
classed as motor vehicle insurance. The amendment makes it unneces-
sary for the carrier to qualify as a health and accident company.
By Section 2, Section 187-A of Chapter 49 of the Laws of 1911,
amended by Section 2 of Chapter 124 of the Laws of 1929,2 is amended
by striking out the clause limiting health and accident policies to a
single risk. The section as amended will make it possible to write group
health and accident insurance.
By Section 3, Section 85 of Chapter 49 of the Laws of 1911, as
amended by Section 1 of Chapter 107 of the Laws of the Extraor-
dinary Session of 1925 and by Section 1 of Chapter 142 of the Laws
of 1931' is amended by striking out the clause limiting the life of a
company, except life companies, to 50 years and prohibiting the ex-
tension of the duration of the company by amendment to the articles
of incorporation. By the change, new companies may now be organized
for any definite period, or perpetually, and existing companies may
achieve the same result by amending their articles.
Chapter 73: This is a new law, which permits domestic mutual fire
insurance companies doing business on the assessment plan and com-
posed exclusively of the members of a specified fraternal society also
to insure corporations, associations and partnerships sponsored by
such society and operated for the benefit of its members. The utility
of the change is obvious.
Chapter 111: This amends Section 92 of Chapter 49 of the Laws
of 19114 by broadening the basis on which a legal reserve life insurance
company may voluntarily value its policies and contracts. Before the
amendment, the companies were limited to the use of the American
"I L. '41, c. 222, § 3, amends Rmw. Rv. STAT. § 3717-49 (Supp. 1939).
"L. '41, c. 222, § 5; amends RxvL REv. STAT. § 3717-66 (Supp. 1939).
2----Rm. REv. STAT. §§ 7032-7298. R m. REV. STAT. § 7234.3 RmW. R v. STAT. § 7130. 'RE. REv. STAT. § 7137.
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Experience Table of Mortality or the Standard or Sub-Standard Indus-
trial Mortality Table with interest at not less than three per centum
per annum; these restrictions are now dropped and any mortality tables
with the same or lower rates of interest may be used so long as the
reserves created thereby are not less in the aggregate than those pro-
duced by the standards provided for the Commissioner's valuation,
nor shall such standards, voluntarily adopted, be changed without
first procuring the Commissioner's consent in writing.
Chapter 112: By Section 1, Section 235, Chapter 49, Laws of 1911,
as amended by Section 1, Chapter 114, Laws of 1931, and by Chapter
158, Laws of 1933, 5 is again amended in several particulars. The sec-
tion deals with the exemption of certain named lodges and fraternal
societies providing death or disability benefits to any one person not
exceeding $1,000 in amount and certain described domestic lodges and
fraternal societies which do not provide death benefits of more than
$500 or disability benefits of more than $300 in any one year from
the requirements of the act. The current amendment limits the amounts
which the named organizations may pay, without complying with the
requirements, to $300, and the described domestic lodges and societies
are similarly limited-to $100 for death benefits and $150 for dis-
ability benefits to any one person in any one year. In addition, the
amendment provides that any exempt society or lodge shall not give
any compensation to any person for procuring new members.
By Section 2, it is provided that the act shall not apply to any asso-
ciation or corporation lawfully organized and operating prior to Febru-
ary 1, 1941.
Chapter 164: This act amends Section 75 of Chapter 49, Laws of
1911,6 dealing with unlicensed insurance companies and their agents,
in several particulars. Firms and corporations, as well as individuals
resident in the state, may now secure a license from the Commissioner
to place insurance upon domestic risks with unlicensed foreign com-
panies, the amount of the penal bond required to be filed with the
Commissioner being set at $1,500, instead of the former sum of not
less than $500 nor more than $2,000 as fixed by the Commissioner.
The affidavit which must be filed with each policy written need no
longer allege that such coverage cannot be secured from any licensed
company, but only that it cannot be procured from a majority of the
companies writing that class of business in the state; this broadens
the choice of the insured as to his carrier, but its possible disastrous
effect upon the business and rate structures of the licensed companies
is avoided by the requirement of a new allegation "that it is not so
placed for the purpose of procuring it at a rate lower than that at
which it will be accepted by any admitted company." Additional
[VOL.16
5 REM. REV. STAT. § 7288. 6 REM. REV. STAT. § 7120.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
changes qualify insurance written under this section for acceptance
by a governmental agency in lieu of insurance written by a licensed
company, pernit an agent for a licensed company to place business
with an agent licensed under this section on a commission basis, and
authorize the Commissioner to make and publish reasonable rules
and regulations for transactions governed by this section and the basis
or bases for his determinations hereunder.
JoHN W. iciLARls.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Chapter 188 is the culmination of a series of attempts, beginning
in 1935 and continuing through the 1937, 1939 and 1941 sessions, to
provide a simple and inexpensive procedure for evicting tenants who
default in the payment of rent and remain in possession without any
claim of right. Under the general unlawful detainer statute' a trial.
in the superior court is required even though the tenant has no rea-
sonable claim of right to possession. As the cost of such litigation is
often several times the monthly rental value of the detained premises
the remedy is frequently more apparent than real.
The new statute does not amend but rather supplements the old
statute.2 It is limited in its application to cases in which the possession
is unlawful because of default in payment of rent and, further, applies
only when the stipulated rent or the rental value of the premises does
not exceed $40.00 per month.' Service of a notice to quit or pay rent,
which is a condition precedent to the existence of a technical unlawful
detainer under the old statute4 has been dispensed with,5 and in its
place is a requirement for service of a summons and complaint, to be
served in the same manner as the notice under the old statute.6 At
the time set for hearing the court is to examine the parties orally and
if it appears that there is no reasonable doubt of the right of the plain-
tiff to be restored to possession, the court orders that a writ of resti.
tution issue. After service of the writ, it is executed if the tenant
does not surrender possession within three days. 7 If the tenant feels
aggrieved at the order of the court he may file a bond to be approved
by the court, and the court shall thereupon recall the writ of restitution
REIV. REV. STAT. §§ 812 et seq.
2 WASm. CoNsT., AnrT. II, § 37, provides that "... the act revised or sec-
ti6n amended shall be set forth at full length." If chapter 188 revises
or amends the existing unlawful detainer statute, this constitutional
provision is violated because the act is not amendatory in form. The
Washington court, however,. holds that the constitution is not violated
if the new act is complete in itself. State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Dept.
of Public Service, 1 Wn. (2d) 102, 95 P. (2d) 1007 (1939). But, is Chapter
188 complete in itself?
'REM. REV. STAT. § 812 (2). § 1.
d§ 4. § 6.
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and order the parties to proceed to trial in the usual form of action."
If, upon the oral examination of the parties, it appears that there is a
reasonable doubt as to the landlord's right to be restored to possession,
the court itself shall order the parties to proceed in the usual form
of action.9 If the parties are for either of these reasons ordered to
proceed in the usual form of action, the filing and service of the
complaint under the new statute are to be equivalent to the notice which
is otherwise required under the general statute. 0
At the outset the question arises under the new statute as to the for-
feiture of the leasehold interest of a tenant who fails to promptly pay
rent when due. At common law failure to pay rent when due did not
cause a forfeiture of the leasehold interest unless an express condition
to this effect was incorporated in the lease." The general unlawful
detainer statute of this state modifies the common law rule by providing
that upon default in the payment of rent the landlord may give a three-
day notice to quit or pay rent12 which, if not complied with, permits
the landlord to proceed under the statute and obtain a judgment for-
feiting the leasehold estate.1 3 However, under the general statute,
the tenant can protect his estate from forfeiture by paying up within
the three-day period.1 4 The first section of the new act provides that
no notice to quit or pay rent, other than the filing and service of com-
plaint in an action brought pursuant to the act, is required to render
the tenant's possession unlawful and that the tenant's possessory rights
may be re-instated if the landlord thereafter accepts payment of the
rent. 5 As soon as the landlord serves and files the complaint under
this act, then, it appears that the leasehold estate is extinguished unless
the landlord is willing to and does permit the tenant to pay the past-
due rent. So construed, this statue deprives the tenant of the oppor-
8 § 7. At this point the statute is not clear as to what is meant by "the
usual form of action." By reading the statute as a whole it is apparent
that the form of action referred to is procedure under the general unlawful
detainer statute. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 812 et seq.
§ 6.
10§ 8.
11 Brown's Admin. v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864). The landlord might
distrain chattels for unpaid rent or maintain an action at law.
" R2EM. REV. STAT. § 812 (3).
13 REM. REV. STAT. § 827.
1Additional relief against forfeiture of the leasehold estate even
after judgment is also provided under the general unlawful detainer
statute. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 817, 830.
1" The second sentence of the section reads: "If the landlord shall,
after such default in the payment of rent, accept payment . . ." (Italics
supplied). However, it seems that the words in italics must be read to
mean after filing and service of complaint, because, until the complaint is
filed and served, according to the terms of the first sentence in this sec-
tion, the tenant is still in lawful possession and, therefore, there are no
possessory rights to be re-instated; he is still in lawful possession until
the complaint is filed and served.
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tunity to avoid a forfeiture of his estate by paying up within three days
after he has notice except the landlord be willing. Such a construction,
of course, opens the way for the landlord who desires to obtain pos-
session of premises, held under a lease which has some time to run,
to take advantage of the slightest dereliction in payment of rent to
effect an immediate termination of the leasehold estate. While this is
consistentwith the general legislative policy in this state to show greater
consideration for the landlord than for the generally inarticulate ten-
ant,16 the expediency of this manifestation of the policy may well be
questioned at a time when a housing shortage, induced by rapidly
expanding defense activities, is acute in many parts of this state.'7
The Washington court, however, may be able to avoid this un-
desirable construction of the new act. One ground which may be sug-
gested is that, so construed, the act unreasonably discriminates between
tenants paying $40.00 or less and those paying more than this amount
by depriving the former of the opportunity to redeem from the for-
feiture after notice given while the latter, who must be proceeded
against under the general unlawful detainer statute, have three days
in which to forestall such a forfeiture. Another possible suggestion is
that the 8th section of the new act, which provides that filing and
service of a complaint under the act is equivalent to a notice to pay rent
or surrender possession under the general unlawful detainer statute,
means that the defendant in such an action is entitled to the same
three-day period within which to pay up the rent past due, as a matter
of right rather than by grace of the landlord.:' While this would
afford the tenant a three-day period of grace when no specific mention
of any such period is found in the new act itself, the equity of accord-
ing to the tenant of low rental value property the same protections
against forfeiture of his leasehold interest that the general statute
gives to the lessee of more valuable property seems to justify the sug-
gested construction of this statutory language.
Several other questions may rise under this statute. First, since the
new act is only supplemental, could the plaintiff elect to proceed under
16 Compare, e.g., the provision for 20-day notice by the landlord to
terminate a periodic tenancy-REM. REV. STAT. § 812 (2)-with the 30-day
notice required for termination by the tenant-REM. REV. STAT. § 10619.
V7 to the Washington policy at such a time, the Washington act
may be contrasted with the rent laws of New York City and Washington,
D. C., during the last war, statutes which protected tenants against
eviction, unreasonable increase in rentals, etc.. during the emergency
period.
Is § 8 follows those sections which make provision for discontinuance
of proceedings under the new act under certain circumstances. By reason
of its position in the act it seems to relate only to the case in which the
parties proceeded under the general statute-and might have been meant
only to dispense with the necessity of giving the usual three-day notice
in such cases, the complaint filed and served being declared a substitute
for such three-day notice. However, it may be construed to have a
broader effect notwithstanding its location in the act.
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either one? It seems that he could, as the act is apparently for his
benefit alone.
Next, the statute is applicable only where the "stipulated rent Or
rental value does not exceed $40.00 per month." Where there is a stip-
ulated rent but it is not the same as the actual rental value, which
amount is controlling? It seems likely that the actual rental value pro-
vision was inserted solely to take care of cases in which the only agree-
ment is for a reasonable rental or where the rent is fixed in terms
other than money. This provision, it seems, should be disregarded
where a definite monetary rent is stipulated. 9
Under the general unlawful detainer statute the landlord must ex-
ecute and file a surety bond to protect the tenant when a writ of resti-
tution issues before judgment,20 but none is required if the landlord
waits until after final judgment has been entered. Section 10 of the
new statute provides that "the plaintiff shall not be required to
give bond to the defendant or the sheriff2" for the issuance or execu-
tion of the writ of restitution." The new act, therefore, permits resti-
tution of the premises to the landlord without the expense of a bond
protecting the tenant, at approximataly the same time that it could
have been procured under the old act with bond posted. It seems
clear, however, that if the plaintiff is required by the court to proceed
under the general unlawful detainer statute the bond requirement of
that act would be operative. But if an order in favor of the landlord
is entered under the new act he is then entitled to possession and if
the tenant desires to have a trial on the issues he must give a forth-
coming bond in the amount of double the rent found due plus $200
in order to retain possession until the issues are finally decided in the
usual form of action." As to bond requirements, then, the new act
very neatly reverses the tables. The tenant must now post bond if
he desires to retain possession while the issues are tried under the gen-
eral statute whereas the landlord was required to post bond if he
desired to obtain possession before judgment under the older statute.2 3
ALFRED HARSCHt.
"
9 Other situations raising similar questions may be suggested. For
example, when the rent has been increased from less than $40.00 per
month to more than $40.00 per month.
20 REm. REv. STAT. § 819.
21 At common law the sheriff is not liable for executing a writ which
is fair on its face, but it has been customary for sheriffs to demand a bond
before proceeding to make a levy. WASH. LAWS 1935, c. 33, § 1, however,
seems to permit the sheriff to demand such bond only when an adverse
claimant to the property levied upon appears. The language quoted in the
text appears to dispense with bonds to the sheriff, even though there
be such a claimant. What if the plaintiff-landlord is, in fact, insolvent
and the writ proves ultimately to have been wrongfully issued? The
sheriff would then have no protection whatever.
22§ 7.
23This may be justified on the basis that an order is to be entered




The really important change in the property tax laws is made in
Chapter 120 relating to the taxation of forest crops and forest lands.
A forest crop is defined as merchantable timber growing on forest
land, and forest land is defined as land not classified or eligible for
classification as reforestation land under Capter 40 of the Laws of
1931.1 It is the duty of each county assessor to classify all forest lands
in his county, as so defined, for the purpose of the new law, but an
important provision gives to the owner the option of not having his
land so classified. The result is that under the property tax laws of
this state there will be three kinds of forest lands and three kinds of
property taxes. First, there will be land classified as reforestation land.
This is valued by statute at $1.00 or 50 cents an acre, depending on
location 2 and is subject to the general property tax at this figure. In
addition, when timber on reforestation land reaches maturity and is
cut, it is subject* to a yield tax of 122 per cent of the market value of
the timber so cut.- Second, there will be land which is not reforesta-
tion land but which the owner objects to having classified under this
new law. This land and the timber on it will be subject to the general
property tax but Chapter 120 makes one important change. Section
2 states broadly and without qualification that "for the purpose of
taxation, all forest crops shall be deemed to be personal property...
and all forest land shall be deemed to be real property." This plainly
makes a change, though earlier provisions are not explicitly amended."
Third, there will be land which again is not reforestation land but
which is classified under this new law. The owner makes no objection
and is willing to accept the benefits of the act. As to such land the
tax works out this way. The forest, crop, which is the merchantable
timber, is, as already noted, deemed to be personal property while the
land without the crop is treated as real property (Section 2). The
land is then taxed like any other land, but since, for purposes of assess-
judge hearing the matter that "there is no reasonable doubt of the right
of the plaintiff to be restored to the possession of said property"--§ 6-
and that it is improbable that both error on the part of the judge
and insolvency of the landlord will coincide. It is possible, however,
that they may.
IRrmv. REv. STAT. §§ 11219-1 to 11219-15.
2 Rm. REV. STAT. § 11219-7.
IEsi REv. STAT. § 11219-10..
'Under existing law "real property" is defined to include "all standing
timber growing thereon, except standing timber owned separately from
the ownership of the land upon which the same may stand or be growing,"
1mw. REv. STAT. § 11108, while "personal property" is defined to include
"all standing timber held or owned separately from the ownership of
the land on which it may stand." Rmw. Rsv. STAT. § 11109. Section 2 of
the new law does not use the term "standing timber" but the term used,
"forest crops," is explicitly extended to cover crops ". . . whether owned
separately from or in conjunction with the ownership of the land . . ."
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ment, it is to be treated as though there was no timber on it, it will
doubtless be assessed at a nominal or very low figure.5 This same
situation will exist, of course, for land not classified under the new
law. The forest crop is then assessed as personal property. The bene-
fits under the act grow out of the division of the tax into the "current
tax" and the "deferred tax." For each of the first ten years of classi-
fication under the act the total tax is to be successively reduced by
7Y per cent and the amount so determined is to be the "current tax."
The "deferred tax" is to be the amount by which the total tax has
been so reduced. For example, if the total tax is $1, then the current
tax is 92Y cents and the deferred tax 7 cents for the first year. At
the end of the tenth year, after successive reductions of the current
tax by 7 per cent of the $1, or 7 cents in the example, and, as
a consequence, successive increases in the deferred tax by the same
7 cents, the result is that the current tax will be 25 cents or 25 per
cent of the total tax, and the deferred tax will be 75 cents or 75 per
cent of it. At the end of this ten-year period it is provided that there
shall be no further diminution and thereafter the current tax will be
25 per cent and the deferred tax 75 per cent of the total tax (Section
4). It has been assumed in the example that the total tax remains the
same for the ten-year period so that the figures come out to 25 per cent
and 75 per cent in the tenth year. This will not be true, but variations
from year to year are not apt to be great enough during the first ten-
year period to throw the figures too far away from 25 per cent and 75
per cent in the tenth year. At any rate, after the tenth year the statute
fixes the percentages of current and deferred taxes at 25 per cent and
75 per cent. The current tax is to be paid currently like any other
personal property tax. The deferred tax is to draw interest at 3 per
cent and any accrued interest is to be paid along with the current tax
(Section 5) but the deferred tax itself is not payable until the owner
applies for a permit to harvest the forest crop (Section 6). He may not
harvest without a permit (Section 6). No time limit is put on harvesting
so that the deferred tax becomes payable only when the owner decides
to harvest and then, of course, only as to so much of the timber as is
harvested."
The foregoing description of this new tax gives the main outlines
but it is enough to point up a brief discussion of some of the constitu-
tional questions raised. The taxpayer whose lands have been classified
under the act may be estopped from raising any constitutional issue.
'See Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 97 Wash. 534, 167
Pac. 35 (1917) for a case in which it was recognized that the land without
timber might have a value for tax purposes.
IIt should be noted that the deferred tax may never aggregate more
than 25 per cent of the assessed value of the forest crop. Section 4 pro-




At least the point is arguable for it will be said that he has accepted
the benefits of the act.7 But if a county assessor should simply refuse
to perform his duties under the act a writ of mandamus or mandate
might be sought and the constitutional questions brought into court
in that way. 8
The chief question raised by the act is under the uniformity clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the State Constitution. So far as
here material that provides that "All taxes shall be uniform upon the
same class of property .... All real estate shall constitute one class:
Provided, That the legislature may tax... lands devoted to reforesta-
tion by either a yield tax or an ad valorem tax . . . or by both." The
proviso is mentioned because it was relied on by the court to sustain
the validity of the reforestation tax law.9 The new forest crop law
must stand or fall without benefit of any proviso. It will then be
argued that all real estate is not taxed uniformly because forest land
is to be assessed as though there was no standing timber on it, while
other land does not enjoy any such benefit. The timber is standing, all
right, but the statute tells the asessor that he must pretend it is not
there at all. This may be met if the court Is willing to sustain the statu-
tory declaration that standing timber is to be treated as personal prop-
erty. In 1907 the legislature declared that standing timber
- 
owned
separately from the land on which it stood should be treated as per-
sonal property for tax purposes' but this provision has never been
challenged in court. In 1921 the court sustained the power of the
legislature to classify the real and personal property of a street railroad
system as personal property for tax purposes." If this step is taken
then it is not too difficult to say that all land is being taxed uniformly
for now some land has timber on it and some does not. It was no human
hand that cut it down but it was a valid legislative hand and that is
good enough.
I Having reached this point it may then be argued that the provisions
for deferment of part of the personal- property tax result in a violation
Many instances of this will be found in Note, Estoppel to Contest the
Constitutionality of a Statute (1934), 34 COL. L. REV. 1495.
8 This was the method employed to test the constitutionality of the,
reforestation tax law, State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley,
177 Wash. 65, 31 P. (2d) 539 (1934). The use of this writ in tax matters
is discussed in McAllister, Taxpayers' Remedies-Washington Property
Taxes (1938), 13 WASH. L. Rsv. 91, 109-112.
OState ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31
P. (2d) 539 (1934).
'10 WASH. LAWS 1907 c. 108, § 2; see the same in WASH. LAWS, Ex. Sess.
1925, c. 130, § 5, REm. REV. STAT. § 11109. Unless the timber came under
this provision it was taxed as real property, Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.
v. Pierce County, 97 Wash. 534, 167 Pac. 35 (1917); France v. Deep River
Logging Co., 79 Wash. 336, 140 Pac. 361 (1914).
"Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 117 Wash.-351, 201 Pac.
449 (1921), affirmed 264 U. S. 22 (1924) sustaining a statute treating all
operating property of street railways as personal property for tax purposes.
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of the uniformity clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the State
Constitution, quoted above, or of the equal privileges clause'12 or both.
In the light of some recent Washington cases it is easy enough to work
out a good verbal argument on these points1" but verbosity can be
matched with more important stuff if the court can be persuaded to
see it that way. 4 The trouble is that this is beyond question a property
tax and when it comes to property taxes the Supreme Court has been
none too easy to persuade.'"
BECK P. MCALLISTER.
TRUSTS
Chapter 41 is a comprehensive act covering investments of trust
funds by banks and trust companies. It provides that corporations
doing a trust business shall invest trust funds in the securities and in
the manner specified in the act, and not otherwise. Investments shall
be made in the following decribed securities:
1. Direct and general obligations of the United States or of any
instrumentality of the United States, the interest and principal of which
is unconditionally guaranteed by the United States.'
2. Certain obligations of the National Mortgage Association and
Federal Housing Administration.
" "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of cititzens, or
corporation, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon
the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations."
WASH. CONST., ART. I, § 12.
13 See particularly State v. Inland Empire Refineries, 3 Wn. (2d) 651,
101 P. (2d) 975 (1940).
" The whole subject is explored in Sholley, Are the Gasoline, Cigarette
and Sales Taxes Unconstitutional? (1940) 15 WAsH. L. REv. 215. But see
the judicial somersault in the very recent decision sustaining the fuel
oil tax of 1937. Texas Co. v. Cohn, 108 Wash. Dec. 293, 112 P. (2d) 522 (1941).
State v. Inland Empire Refineries, 3 Wn. (2d) 651, 101 P. (2d) 975 (1940),
cited supra note 13, was "distinguished." The judicial wind must be blow-
ing more gently this year.
",The outstanding examples are, of course, the personal income tax
cases, Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933); Jensen v.
Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P. (2d) 607 (1936) and the corporate income
tax case, Petroleum Navigation Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 495, 55 P. (2d)
1056 (1936). Persuasion was, however, accomplished in State ex rel.
Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659 2 P. (2d) 653 (1931) and Vance Lumber
Co. v. King County, 184 Wash. 402, 51 P. (2d) 623 (1935). This last case
is particularly pertinent.
'Through clerical error the clause "direct and general obligations
of the United States" was omitted from the enrolled bill. In the absence of
ambiguity, the enrolled bill is conclusive. State ex rel. Dunbar v. State
Board, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926). There is an ambiguity in the
section, however, which would give a court the right to examine the
antecedent history of the bill for the purpose of determining the legis-
lative intent. State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board, supra; State ex rel.
Fair v. Hamilton, 92 Wash. 347, 159 Pac. 379 (1916); State v. Superior
Court, 70 Wash. 545, 127 Pac. 120 (1912). It being clear from the ante-
cedent history that the bill as considered by the legislature and actually
passed did include the direct and general obligations of the United States,
it is inconceivable that our court would not so hold if the question arises
in any future litigation.
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3. Direct and general obligations of the Dominion of Canada in-
cluding those of its instrumentalities, the payment of which is uncon-
ditionally guaranteed by the Dominion, all of such obligations to be
payable in legal funds of the United States at a place in the United
States.
4. Direct and general bonds and warrants of the State of Washington.
5. Direct and general obligations of any political subdivision of the
state, payable by unlimited general tax levies.
6. Water revenue bonds and warrants payable at definite times,'
of any city within the state of the first, second or third class, for the
payment of which the revenues of the particular water system are
irrevocably pledged.
7. Light and power revenue bonds of any city of the first and sec-
ond class within the state, where the revenues of the particular light
plant have been irrevocably pledged.
8. Direct and general obligations of the various states of the United
States payable by an unlimited levy of general taxes.
9. Direct and general obligations of any political subdivision of other
states where such political subdivision has a population of not less
than 20,000, such obligations to be payable by an unlimited general
tax levy, with the proviso that it shall be sufficient in the states of
Idaho and Oregon if a county has 5,000 population and any other
political subdivision 1,500.
10. In first mortgages on improved -real estate within the State of
Washington for an amount not greater than 60 per cent of the value,
of the property.
11. Certain obligations of railroad, terminal and depot companies
and equipment trust obligations.
12. Bonds of public utility companies, including telephone com-
panies, having a certain financial standing.
13. Certain obligations of industrial corporations whose assets are
not less than $100,000,000 and whose working capital is at least equal
to the total of its funded debt.
14. Investment in savings accounts and banks where the deposits
are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or in invest-
ment share accounts of any savings and loan association to the extent
that such shares are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation.
15. Investments may also be made in such other securities as are
specifically provided in the instrument creating the trust.
The act contains a number of safeguards surrounding the various
investments. In the case of municipalities there must be no default
in the payment of any of its obligations within ten years prior to the
making of the investments, and where a mortgage loan is in excess
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of 50 per cent of appraised value, payments must be amortized.
The provisions in regard to investment in railroad, public utility
and telephone obligations are copied verbatim from the New York
statute, for the reason that the New York laws are very comprehensive,
and also the New York State Banking Department issues lists of the
securities which comply with the requirements of its Investment Act,
which lists are available for use by banks and trust companies in this
state. The Washington State Banking Department does not have
facilities to make the investigation necessary to determine which of
these securities comply with our act and it would be difficult for each
individual bank or trust company from its limited information to
determine whether or not a certain security was within the specific
terms of the act. By adopting the wording of the New York act all
that a trustee has to do in making an investment in such security is
to see that it is on the list of securities certified by the New York State
Banking Department.
A trust company has the right to retain the security or property
received by it at the time of the creation of the trust, even if it is not
a legal investment under the act. Investments cannot be made in
preferred or common stocks or in the purchase of real estate unless
the trust instrument authorizes investment in such securities or prop-
erty, or gives the trustee full discretion to make investments in such
securities as it may deem advantageous to the beneficiaries of the
trust. A corporate trustee is not allowed to invest trust funds in any
securities which are in default, nor does it have a right to buy or sell
investments from or to itself.
While this act covers only corporations doing a trust business, Sec-
tion 3 of Chapter 206, Washington Laws 1941, gives a guardian the
right to invest money, without permission of the court, in securities
which are legal investments for trust companies or mutual savings
banks.2 All other investments by guardians must be with the express
permission of the probate court and such court shall not allow such
investments except where it finds upon evidence taken that substantial
loss may result to the ward if such other investment be not made.
The various sections of the statutes covering investments of trust
funds by corporations doing a trust business heretofore in effect are
repealed, and such corporations need in the future only look to the
provisions of this act, both as to the kind of security in which it can
invest trust money and the regulations governing the making and
keeping of such investments.
0. B. THORGRIMSON.
2 See REM. REV. STAT. §§ 3381-3 (a) to 3381-20 inclusive, as amended by
WASH. LAWS 1941, c. 15, for a detailed list of investments that can be made




Two very important changes have been made, both of which sub-
stantially increase the protection afforded by the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act to workmen and to their families.
Compensation Schedule. For the first time since the inauguration of
the workmen's compensation system in 19111 the category of persons to
whom, or on account of whom, compensation awards are payable has
been materially enlarged. Under the new statute children under the age
of eighteen years are treated as dependents of their parents for the pur-
pose of calculating the amount of compensation payable,' whereas,
formerly, the age limit was "under the age of sixteen years."3 More-
over, a dependent invalid child of any age is now declared to have the
same status under the act as a child under eighteen. 4 The former change
no doubt reflects the difficulty of finding employment for minors, along
with everyone else, in recent years, and the current policy of encourag-
ing longer periods of school attendance.
For the third time since 1911, 5 the schedule of compensation pay-
ments has been revised upward.6 The increase is general, and, in certain
important instances, amounts to 50% of the former amount. For ex-
ample, the widow of a killed workman is now to receive $50 per month,
instead of $35 as formerly,7 and the additional monthly award for each
dependent child has been increased $2.50.' A totally disabled workman
is now entitled to an award of $60 per month if married and $50 per
month if unmarried, as compared to the former awards of $40 and $35
respectively. 9 The maximum permissible lump sum commutation of
death or permanent total disability claims has been increased from
$4,000 to $5,000.10 The schedule of lump sum awards for permanent
partial disabilities has been increased throughout, with the maximum
award being increased from $3,000 to $3,600.11
1 L. '11, ch. 74, §5.
2 Rmr. REv. STAT. §§ 7679(a) (1), -(2),-(4), -(b) (3), -(c), etc., as amended
by L. '41, ch. 209, § 1.
3 RF_. REV. STAT. § 7679, subsections cited in preceding note.
I L. '41, ch. 209, § 3. Formerly, no consideration was given to the fact that
an injured workman was supporting an invalid child of sixteen or over. Only
in cases where the workman died as a result of his injuries, leaving no spouse
or children under sixteen, was any provision made for such invalid children, and
then it was limited to the payment of the modest maximum sum of $20 for all
such dependents. R1m. REV. STAT. § 7679(a) (3).
5 L. '17, ch. 28, § 1 (increasing permanent partial disability benefit) ; L. '19,
ch. 131, § 4 (increasing death and total disability benefits) ; L. '29, ch. 209, § 1
(increasing all benefits).6 L. '41, ch. 209, §§ 1, 2, amending REMV. REv. STAT. §§ 7679, 7681. Proposed
Referendum No. 22, filed after this comment was in type, would refer
these sections to vote in Nov., 1942, suspending them until approved by
voters.
7 Rra. REv. STAT. § 7679(a) (1). 8 Id., as amended.
9 ld., §§ 7679(b) (1), -(2). "0Id., § 7681, as amended.
" Id., § 7679(f), as amended.
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The effect of these changes upon future employer contributions is
obvious, yet the added burden is but a reflection of increasing wages on
one hand and an increasing cost of living on the other. Significantly,
the schedule of compensation awards has been substantially increased
during each period of high wages, high prices, and business activity.
12
In most states the increase of compensation awards follows automatic-
ally upon a rise in wages, since their schedules are calculated in terms
of the wages being paid the injured workman. Only Wyoming's stands
with Washington in clinging to the rigid fixed sum type of schedule,
a type, incidentally, which treats all disabled workmen the same,
whether they be earning $75 or $400 per month.
Occupational Disease. From its origin in 1911 until 1937, the Wash-
ington Workmen's Compensation Act extended no protection against
the hazards of diseases induced by the nature or circumstances of the
employment. 4 The remedy of a workman suffering from an occupa-
tional disease was an action at law against his employer for negligent
injury.' 5
In 1937 the Act was amended' 6 to provide compensation for dis-
ability or death caused by any one of a list of 21 specified diseases if
acquired in certain employments specified for each disease, e.g., "An-
thrax. Handling of wool, hair, bristles, hides or skins." The diseases
listed were nearly all of a type caused by the inhalation of dust or
fumes. Certain limitations in respect to time of first exposure to the
disease were imposed. The increased cost was to be, strangely, "borne
equally by employer and employee." Certain modifications in respect to
coverage were made in 1939,' 7 and the method of defraying the added
cost was changed to that of separate additional premiums levied upon
employers at rates varying in different occupations.'
This scheme for caring for the victims of occupational diseases has
been completely altered. In the first place, the listing of the particular
diseases has been abandoned, and a general definition of "occupa-
tional disease" substituted.' 9 The definition is: "such disease or infec-
"2 See note 5, supra.
"See Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation (New York, 1936)
41.
1' Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge Co., 145 Wash. 263, 259 Pac. 720 (1927)
(contraction of tuberculosis as result of inhaling sulphuric acid fumes held not
compensable injury because not "fortuitous"); Pellerin v. Washington Veneer
Co., 163 Wash. 555, 2 P. (2d) 658 (1931) (illness caused by inhalation of
carbon bisulphide held not compensable injury because not "traumatic");
Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 170 Wash. 494, 16 P. (2d) 824 (1932) (ditto
as to lead poisoning caused by inhalation of lead dust).
"See cases cited in preceding note, and Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge Co.,
151 Wash. 430, 276 Pac. 89 (1929).
-"L. '37, ch. 212, § 1.
17 L. '39, ch. 135, § 1; Rrm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7679-1.
"L. '39, ch. 138, § 1; R~r. Ray. STAr. (Supp.) § 7676.
L. '41, ch. 235, § 1, amending Rym. Rzv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7679-1.
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tion as arises naturally and proximately out of extra-hazardous em-
ployment.120 This change extends the coverage of the Act substantial-
ly,21 but it does so at the cost of injecting a large dose of uncertainty
into the law. Who can say what meaning will be given to the key ad-
verbs, "naturally and proximately," and when, for that matter, does a
disease "arise out of employment?" Only a series of supreme court
decisions can furnish reliable answers.
Some guidance can no doubt be obtained from the interpretations
placed on similar provisions in the workmen's compensation statutes of
other jurisdictions. Similar definitions of "occupational disease" are
found in the statutes of California,22 North Dakota, 3 Wiscon-
sin,2 ' Hawaii,2 5 the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act,28 and the United States Employees' Compensation Act.
27
Occupational disease as such is not compensable under the new stat-
ute, but only disability or death caused thereby. On this point the
statute provides: "Each workman who shall suffer disability from an
occupational disease in the course of an extra-hazardous employment,
or his family and dependents in case of death of the workman from
such disease, shall receive the same compensation benefits," care and
treatment as are provided for workmen injured or killed under the
former Act.28 There is an ambiguity here.2" Does the phrase "in the
2 Compare the definition given by the Washington Supreme Court: "Before
any disease may be classified in a legal sense as an occupational disease, it must
be a disease, or diseased condition, which is peculiar to a given occupation and
brought about by exposure to certain harmful conditions which are constantly
present, and to which all workmen in the occupation are continually exposed."
Poison Logging Co. v. Kelly, 195 Wash. 167, 171, 80 P. (2d) 412 (1938). It is
doubtful whether this dictum was intended as a statement of a constitutional
rule, and therefore it should be of no significance in face of an inconsistent
legislative definition.
?'It should be noted that the coverage is limited to disease or infection
acquired in employment which is denominated "extra-hazardous" under the
Act, i.e., those occupations listed in REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7674. Presum-
ably no disease or infection acquired in any other employment, i.e., where the
employer elects to come under the Act under REm. REv. STAT. § 7696, 'will be
compensable unless it falls within the definition of "injury," which appears to be
a remote possibility. See cases cited in fiote 14, supra.
2 CAL. LABO" CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3208: "disease arising out of the
employment.'23N. DAX. Coms'. LAws, Supp. (1925) § 396a2: "Any disease proximately
caused by the employment."
2"Wis. STATuTES, 1939 § 102.03(1) (c): "disease . . . arises out of the 'em-
ployment." This is not a definition of occupational disease, but a condition of the
employer's liability.
-11HAw . REv. LAWS (1935) § 7480: "disease proximately caused by the
employment, or resulting from the nattfre of the employment."
2633 U. S. C. A. § 902(2): "disease or infection as arises naturally out of
such employment." This Act is in force as the workmen's compensation act of
the District of Columbia. Dist. or CoLr MTA CODE (1930) tit. 19, ch. 2.
"5 U. S. C. A. § 790: "any disease proximately caused by the employment."28 L. '41, ch. 235, § 1, amending REm. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7679-1.
"For a discussion of a similar difficulty *under the former Wisconsin Act, see
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course of an extra-hazardous employment" qualify "suffer disability"
or does it qualify "disease?" The former supposition is supported by
grammatical construction, and by the fact that the alternative would
lead to a redundancy since "disease" was already so qualified. On the
other hand, it seems capricious to deny compensation to a workman
whose lungs have been weakened by exposure to stone dust during long
employment in a stone quarry if he is, say, working as a store clerk
when attacked by pneumonia, but to compensate him if he is working
in a logging camp when a lung illness disables him.
Unlike the 1937 and 1939 statutes, the 1941 act imposes no geograph-
ical limitations in respect to the exposure to disease. Apparently a
workman who contracted silicosis in Idaho, moved to this state, and is
disabled while working here, is entitled to compensation. A time limita-
tion is imposed by the proviso that "this act shall not apply where the
last exposure to the hazards of the disease occurred prior to January 1,
1937."3o
Compensation under the new statute is paid from the same fund as is
compensation for disability or death from accidental injury, and em-
ployer contributions are to be determined and assessed as part of the
regular premiums.3 The latter provision is a distinct improvement on
the 1937-39 device of assessing arbitrary additional premiums, a device
which soon ran afoul of judicial condemnation. 32 A serious question is
raised, however, in respect to the determination of premium rates for
particular employers. These rates are determined in a substantial meas-
ure by the employers' "cost experience," which is based upon compen-
sation paid in the recent past to workmen injured in his employment. 33
In the case of the sawmill worker who is disabled because of silicosis
contracted during former employment in a quarry, which employer's
cost experience is to be charged? There can be but one just answer, and,
perhaps, but one constitutional one.3 4 But if quarry operators as a group
are to pay the premiums, why should it make any difference what the
diseased workman is doing when disability overtakes him? It would
seem that the best solution would be to treat the contraction of the
disease as the controlling event in determining both cost experience and
eligibility for benefits. JOHN B. SHOLLEY.
Rabinovitz, Compensation of Occupational Diseases from a Legal Viewpoint,
(1937), 12 WIs. L. REv., 198, 207-216.
• L. '41, ch. 235, § 1, amending REN. RExv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7679-1.
L. '41, ch. 235, § 2.
Polson Logging Co. v. Kelly, 195 Wash. 167, 80 P. (2d) 412 (1938),
enjoining the collection of additional premiums from a logging company because
of the absence of hazard from any of the diseases listed in the 1937 act.
" See Rmaa. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7676 for the method of computing pre-
miums.
"' See the case cited in note 32 supra.
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